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SPECIAL COMMENT
Comprehensive Planning
Legislation: The Kentucky
Experience
JoHN E. KENNEDY*

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 1970, the Kentucky General Assembly authorized a new entity called the "Kentucky Program Development Office"' [hereinafter KPDO]. This new office was created
as part of a national strategy to revamp systems of providing
federal aid to state development. Central to this strategy is
the creation of one agency in each state to coordinate local,
state and federal development programs by using modem comprehensive planning devices. As the designated agency, the
new Kentucky Program Development Office is responsible for
coordinating all Kentucky programs for grants-in-aid under applicable federal acts to achieve the maximum and most effective
use of federal programs.
The history of this development is long. However, the latest
federal impetus came in the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act
of 1968,2 and, with the arrival of Nixon federalism, the Bureau
of the Budget Circular A-95. These legislative and executive
regulations provide that certain federal fund applications have
to be cleared through one central state agency before the applications will be considered by the federal agency. Immediately
* LL.B., Notre Dame; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale; Visiting Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University. The author wishes to acknowledge that a substantial portion of this comment was drawn from extensive research by Charmaine
Marlowe for a seminar in Government Contracts at the University of Kentucky.
1 Ky. Rxv. STAT. [hereinafter KRS] ch. 147A (1970).
2 P.L. 90-577, 82 Stat. 1098 (Oct. 16, 1968), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4244 (1970).
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upon taking office in 1968, Governor Nunn of Kentucky issued
an executive order establishing the new Kentucky Program
Development Office and implementing the boundaries of the
Kentucky Area Development Districts [hereinafter ADD], in
accord with the state clearing house system as required by the
new federal provisions. Kentucky Attorney General Breckinridge, then issued a series of opinions sustaining various powers
of this new office under the executive order. The opinions,
however, required that the Kentucky legislature would have to
sanction the office in the next legislative meeting in January,
1970.
In the 1970 legislative session, the governor's bills were
presented to the General Assembly, and with some amount of
modification, one bill was enacted to create a permanent Kentucky Program Development Office. Although the new law did
not specifically treat the subject, the governor's original executive
order designated the boundaries and organizational requirements
for the Kentucky Area Development Districts. Basically, these
provide for organization of the Districts as non-profit corporations. However, since the Districts also share some governmental
functions they appear to have an interesting hybrid status. This
comment will discuss the background and general nature of the
Office, the Development Districts and will explore several specific
issues: 1) whether the composition of the District Boards are
subject to the Baker v. Care rule of one man, one vote; 2)
whether the Districts will constitutionally be able to issue revenue
bonds for development; 3) whether Kentucky competitive bid
statutes will apply to the Development Districts; and 4) whether
existing conflict of interest statutes will apply to the members
of the District Boards.
II. THE KENTUCKY PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
A central idea of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act and
the A-95 Circular is for the states to establish a single planning
clearinghouse. In Kentucky, the Governor issued executive orders
to establish the Development Office and the Development Dis3369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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tricts4 under his statutory power to distribute and reorganize

certain departments and agencies. The statute provides, however, that an executive order is to be an interim provision and
that the Governor must submit the reorganization to the General
Assembly at the next session. 5
The creation of the KPDO and the fifteen ADDs by the
executive orders necessitated a number of rulings from the Kentucky Attorney General's office. These opinions validated the
legal authority of the arrangement as an interim order, but
emphasized that failure of the General Assembly to confirm
the plan, would terminate the authority of KPDO.6 Contracts
originally made with another department of state government
could be shifted to the KPDO and back again in the event of
the failure of legislative ratification, since the real contracting
party was the Commonwealth of Kentucky.7 Under the legislation, the Governor was under an absolute obligation to recommend confirming legislation to the General Assembly, the theory
of this legislation being to prevent usurpation of legislative power
by the executive branch of state government: "By reserving the
right to approve or reject reorganization orders, the General
Assembly avoids an unconstitutional total surrender of its legislative powers."8
According to the Attorney General opinions, when the Governor recommended legislation to the Legislature, it could 1) enact
the legislation; 2) reject the legislation; 3) enact the legislation
in some modified form; 4) enact other legislation making express
provision for the functions under the executive order; or, 5) take
no action at all. The legislative action in the first four options
would clearly be binding on the Governor and, he could not
4Exec. Order No. 68-489, issued in June, 1968, set out the reason for the
new Development Office and Development Districts, and designated its Adminas Special Assistant to the Governor for Program Development.
istrator
5
"[t]he Governor may: a) establish, abolish, or alter the organization of any
agency or statutory administrative department to explain more dearly the functions
performed by it .... The Governor shall recommend legislation to the next followIng session of the General Assembly to confirm reorganizations effected under the
provisions of this section."
SOp. A=rx. GEN. 69-148.
7 Op. ATr. GENr. 69-51. This opinion discusses the effect on contracts made
with the Department of Commerce under the Housing and Development Act. The
Opinion held that the contracts are legally binding on the successor agency, the
Kentucky Program Development Office.
8 O. Arr. GEN. 69-51.
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legitimately issue an executive order identical to the previous
one. Presumably, then, where the legislature, as here, took option
(3) by enacting legislation in a modified form, the Governor
must abide by the legislative decision although he may disagree
with it.
In commenting upon the fifth alternative (no action), the
opinions held that the preferred definition of the statutory requirements of "confirm" contemplates formal, positive action to
ratify and validate what is proposed. Consequently, if the General Assembly had taken no action on the recommended bill,
theoretically it would have been equivalent to rejection by failure
of passage. However, it was noted that a ratification of the
performance of a function of state government by a state agency,
may be accomplished by legislative appropriation of funds for
that purposeY This 'loophole" was perhaps a distinct possibility,
should the General Assembly balk at the proposal, since the
availability of much of the federal program money was conditioned upon state appropriations of money for comprehensive
planning. 10 In any event, the subsequent adoption of the legislation in modified form, apparently ratified the various attorney
general's opinions validating the authority of the KPDO to
participate as the planning agency in the various federal
programs."
Two bills were sponsored by the administration, House Bill
176, authorizing the Program Development Office, and House
Bill 175, authorizing the Area Development Districts. The first,
as modified, was enacted; the second was not. Political opposition generally could be expected to develop from three groups:
9
In Martin v. Chandler, 818 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1958), it was held that when
the legislature has appropriated funds for the performance of a particular function,
this constitutes
a valid legislative election that the state engage in that function.
' 0 Various newspaper articles note that the 1970 legislature had already appropriated funds for KPDO, even before passing the legislation authorizing the
Office, see notes 12-14 infra.
11 In regard to whether the Kentucky Program Development Office may accept
federal funds under a specific act such as Title IX of the Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, OAG 68-189 holds that the Kentucky
Program Development Office clearly has such power. In OAG 68-190 the same
decision was made in reference to the authority of KPDO to administer a training
and research program for Kentucky under Title VIII of the Housing Act of 1964
which requires that:
"No grants may be made to a State under this part unless the Administrator has approved a plan for the State which designates an officer
or agency of the State Government who has responsibility and authority
for the administration of a statewide research and training program."
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those on the national level who wanted to avoid state, i.e.
Governor's, control in the flow of federal money to local projects;
those on the state level in other agencies who wanted the
planning and approval power under their own jurisdiction; and
those in local political units who would lose power of approval
to the development districts and the Governor."2 The opposition
had some impact, but could not override the main thrust of the
federal demand for state comprehensive planning nor the governor's press for the plan as one of his key legislative proposals.
After some politicking, 13 the proposals were trimmed to a streamlined version and the Second Committee Substitute for House
Bill 176 was enacted on Monday, March 16, 1970.
As enacted into new Chapter 147A of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes [hereinafter KRS], the law created the Kentucky Program Development Office within the Office of the Governor.
The administrator of this office is the Special Assistant to the
Governor for Program Development and is Secretary to the State
Planning Committee. He is responsible for liaison with the
appropriate state and federal agencies with respect to the 1)
Economic Development Act, 2) Appalachian Regional Development Act, 8) Housing and Urban Development Act of 1954,
4) Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of
1966, 5) Land and Water Resources Act, and 6) Comprehensive
Health Planning Act. The most significant federal program
omitted from the old executive order was the Economic Op4
portunity Act'

The Act designates the Kentucky Program Development
Office as the official state planning office to administer the
Commonwealth's development planning funds. Significantly, the
Office is given statutory power to designate various development areas, and development organizations and to approve area
12

See Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 23, 1970 § B at 1, col. 4.

13 House Bills 175 and 176 were first rewritten to remove poverty war and

education programs from the development districts, and to decentralize the authority of the Governor over the Districts by establishing a commission on area development composed of the governor, lieutenant governor, and the attorney general.
14 The editorial 'A New Routine For Federal-Money Users," Louisville
Courier-Journal, Mar. 1, 1970, § F, at 2, col. 1 points out that the KPDO approach

through regional planning-physical facilities-growth centers is basically at odds
with the OEO-grass roots-people involvement approach. Education funds were
also apparently excluded from the jurisdiction of the KPDO although it is not

entirely clear what role KPDO and the ADD's will play in planning educational
facilities.
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development programs. The Office is also given authority to
provide the state's approval for proposals to federal agencies
when state approval is provided for in federal law. There is,
however, a puzzling modification of the original bill. The new
Act carries the provision: "however, final determination and
certification of proposals to federal agencies shall be at the
discretion of the unit submitting the proposal." 15 This provision
appears, at first sight, to remove all real authority from the
Kentucky Program Development Office, if an agency wants to
proceed on its own without KPDO approval. However, realistically the only threat to the power of the Kentucky Program
Development Office would be the possibility of an approval
by the federal agency of the proposed application. This possibility is rather remote in light of the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Act of 1968 and the A-95 Circular. The Congressional intent
behind these provisions is to provide for one central state clearinghouse to review all possible applications. If the federal agency
were to receive an application for federal funds which was not
approved by the KPDO as the clearinghouse, it seems that this
disapproval would provide an excellent excuse for rejection of
the application. Since there are certainly more applications than
available funds, the federal agency would not need much excuse
to reject it. On the other hand, it could be argued that the
application might be approved by the federal agency, despite
the clearinghouse disapproval, because the federal agency may
wish to rely upon the Kentucky statute to ignore the clearinghouse disapproval. In any case the ambiguity of this provision
has potential for causing trouble, but was no doubt necessary
in order to effect a political compromise necessary to passage of
the legislation.
III. THE KENTUCKY AREA DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS
A. IN GENERAL
House Bill 175 proposed the creation of the
Development Districts as they had been set up in
Since H.B. 175 was not enacted by the General
might be argued that the legal authority for the
15KRS oh. 147A § 2(4).

fifteen Area
E.O. 68-653.
Assembly, it
development
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Districts ceased to exist. However, it is more plausible to conclude that since KRS Ch. 147A as enacted gave the authority
to the KPDO to designate development areas and organizations,
the legislature could not make up its mind on the details and
delegated this authority to the KPDO so as not to freeze the
whole set up into the legislation.
Under H.B. 175 and the executive order the Development
District Boards are to draw up comprehensive plans for their
districts, including plans for health, education, transportation,
community service, environment and human resources. The
District has the power to review every plan made by any political
subdivision within its jurisdiction where federal money is concerned. The work of these Boards would be coordinated by
having them supervised and assisted by the KPDO which would
act as a clearinghouse to funnel District requests to Washington
after making sure there are no duplications. 16
Each Development District is set up as a non-profit public
corporation and is registered with the Secretary of State. The
Development District is to adopt a charter and enact by-laws
setting forth the purposes and operating procedures under KPDO
guidelines." Procedures include the method by which representatives on the Area Development Board are selected.
According to the administration theory, the KPDO is not
a regulatory office since it is designated to carry out the review
of state agency, local government, and District programs. Similarly, the Area Development District itself in official theory is
not another level of local government, nor is it an agency with
any directive power within itself. It is a public agency to serve
as an adjunct to local governments and organizations and to
be utilized by them as a mechanism to achieve together in an
orderly and responsible way those things they cannot accomplish
16 Kentucky

Area Development Districts, pp. 4, 10 (Kentucky Program De-

velopment Office, Frankfort, Ky., 1970).
17 A reading of the Kentucky River Area Development District Charter
reveals that the typical District Appears to have all the powers and capacities of
a private corporation, such as to contract, hold realty, receive grants, incur debts,
to be exercised within a large number of "doing good" purposes, which, in sum,
add up to isacting
for theingeneral
welfare.
The potential of the ADD s beyond mere
planning
indicated
the report
Tandy
Industries Cancel Plans for Letcher
County,
Mountain
Eagle,
April 30,
1970,siteVol. 62, No. 51, which
describes Whitesburg
a plan to have
the KRAD
purchase
a plant
and to make available
$450,000 for the construction of a home building taetory.
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by themselves.' 8 However, despite the official theory the power
of disapproval of a plan or an application for funds realistically
accomplish an indirect form of regulation in KPDO and another
level of local government in the ADD.
B. IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE DISTRICT BOARD SUBJECT
TO BAKER v. CARR?

The KPDO Theory of the District Board composition is to
respect political reality by giving local politicians control of
the Board but to provide additional membership in the organization to various existing community groups. According to the
guidelines set down by KPDO, the Board of Directors of each
District will consist of all County judges, and one Mayor for
each County, plus a number of lay members to be selected to
the Board. Existing interest group organizations may be permitted to designate representatives to serve as members of the
organization. They must represent Commerce, Industry, Labor,
Agriculture, Law, Medicine, Finance, Education, Civic Organizations, Social, Religious, and Ethnic Groups. The number of these
members selected to the Board should not exceed 49%. It is
recommended that at least two lay members should be from low
income or minority groups and preferably elected through the
community action process.
When the theory of this organizational strategy is contrasted
to the "grass roots" approach of the Community Action Councils
under the OEO, it could be forecast that a persistent political
dispute would arise over the sufficiency of designating only two
positions for the low income or racial minority groups. The
theory of the poor people's approach is that since their problems
are the cause for the federal money flow, it is not fair to let the
the "main-street crowd" control the money for projects which
will allegedly serve the rich and not the poor.' 9
It is difficult to assess the weight of voting strength proportionate to the share of population represented by a specific
District Board of Directors. In fact it may be impossible to
38 Comments to Draft Legislation Creating Kentucky Program Development
Oflice (KPDO, 1970).
19 The Sap of Militancy: Long After The Battle Has Been Won Elsewhere,
Kentucky Poor Must Still Fight State, Whitesburg Mountain Eagle, April 9, 1970,
at 3, col. 2-4.
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figure out. However, it is argued that the most important thing
is that the representatives of various groups have a "voice"
with which to express interest, as district programs are planned,
and to advise as to the nature of district programs approved,
so they may choose to participate as is appropriate. On the
other hand, this pragmatic approach of mixing political representation with interest group representation is not entirely compatible with the idealistic goals of one-man, one-vote theory.
In Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas
City, Mo.,20 the Kansas City School District fixed the apportionment plan which resulted in the election of three trustees, or
50% of the total number from that district. Since that district
contained approximately 60% of the total school enumeration in
the junior college district, appellants brought suit claiming their
right to vote for trustees was being unconstitutionally diluted
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court held that since the trustees can levy
and collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restriction, hire and
fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline
students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire
property by condmenation and manage the operations of the
junior college, the trustees perform important governmental functions within the districts. Therefore, the representation was invalid since according to Avery v. Midland Co.,2 1 a qualified voter
in a local election has a constitutional right to have his vote
counted with substantially the same weight as that of any other
voter where the elected officials exercised general governmental
powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.
The Court in Hadley points out that the purpose of a particular
election is not a determinative factor since it is too difficult to
distinguish between elections for legislative officials and those
for administrative officials. Therefore, the rule applies to all
elections where equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionately equal numbers of officials.
In the case of the Area Development Districts, it can be
argued the Board of Directors will be exercising general governmental powers similar to these trustees. They have the power
2090 S. Ct. 79 (1970).
21390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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to issue bonds, make contracts and acquire property. Further,
development and planning are vital functions similar to education. In Hadley, the voters in large school districts frequently
had less effective voting power than the residents of small
districts. Similarly, in our Development Districts, the larger
county has the same vote as a smaller county and the representative of a few people in the health field has the same vote as
that of organized labor.
On the other hand, it is also pointed out in Hadley that
where a State chooses to select members of an official body
by appointment rather than by election, that choice does not
offend the Constitution. The fact that each official does not
represent the same number of people does not deny those
people equal protection. Therefore, in the Development Districts, the designation of the county officials to the Board and
the Board's selection of organizations that designate a representative are not constitutionally invalid under existing legal
precedent. Whether the composition of the Boards is wise policy
is another question.
justice Harlan's dissent in Hadley v. Junior College District
of Kansas City, points out the need to preserve flexibility in the
design of local governmental units that serve specialized functions
and the need to meet peculiar local conditions. These needs
furnish a powerful reason for refusing to extend one man-one
vote requirements to Development Districts where the purpose
of the organization is to plan for peculiar local conditions on a
regional basis. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the
theory of Justice Harlan's dissent is fully applicable because in
Hadley the districts could choose to avoid alliance with a highly
populated neighbor but in the case of the Development Districts,
the Counties have previously been grouped together and they
and their residents have no choice in the matter.
C. DOES THE DISTRICT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE
REVENUE BONDS?

Under their charters, the Development Districts are apparently authorized to issue revenue bonds. -2 However, the question
22 Under the charter of the Kentucky River Area Development District Charter,
for example, the corporation may invest or borrow money and secure the same by
(Continued on next page)
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can be raised whether the use of state or federal funds to underwrite bonds to encourage private industry would be a violation
of the Kentucky Constitution, Section 177 which provides:
"[T]he credit of the Commonwealth shall not be given,
pledged, or loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or
association, municipality or political subdivision of the state;
nor shall the Commonwealth become an owner or stockholder in, nor make donations to any company, association,
or corporation."
In Industrial Development Authority v. Eastern Kentucky
Regional Planning Commission, 3 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that when the underlying and activating purpose of the
transaction and the financial obligation incurred are for the
State's benefit, there is no lending of its credit even though it
may have expended its funds or incurred an obligation that
benefits another. Merely because private parties may incidentally
profit does not bring the transaction within the letter or spirit
of the 'credit clause' prohibition. In this case, it was shown
that the investment of state funds in an industrial project would
not violate the Constitution because the Authority would not
be giving, pledging, or lending the credit of the State and it
would not become a surety or guarantor because the rents from
the property would be the security. The court had previously
held in Dyche v. City of London, 4 that relief of unemployment
in the City of London and the surrounding area was a "public
purpose" within the purview of the taxing power of that city,
and that the city could lawfully incur a bonded indebtedness
to construct an industrial building in an effort to attract new
industry and thereby reduce unemployment.
D. ARE THE DISTRICTS REQUIRED TO EMPLOY
COMPETITIVE BIDS?
Another question that may be posed in reference to the
various powers of the Development District is whether any
competitive bid statutes would apply to contracts executed by
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

pledging any or all of its assets or by executing mortgages and may execute notes

or other indebtedness.
23 882 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1970).
24 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956).
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the Development District. The basic purpose behind competitive
bid statutes is to enable the government to secure work or
supplies at the lowest price possible and to guard against favoritism or corruption. One statute which might have application
to the Development District, requires competitive bids in the
purchase of "the combined requirements of all spending agencies
of the state."2 5 It is doubtful however that a District could be
termed a "spending agency of the state" in light of Court of
Appeals opinions, which narrowly interpret the statute. 26
Another example shows judicial reluctance to require competitive bids unless the statute expressly covers the case. In
Commonwealth v. Nunn,27 where in addition to the competitive
bid statute, KRS 18.440 also provided "The Commissioner of
Finance is authorized to perform all acts necessary or advisable
for the purpose of contracting for and maintaining insurance
under KRS §§ 18.410 to 18.440," the court held that no competitive bidding was required as to group life insurance policies
for state employees. It reasoned that if the legislature had intended the kind of insurance policies provided for to be subject
to competitive bidding it would have so specified.
An examination of authorizing legislation, the executive
orders and the various powers of the development district as
provided in a typical charter shows that no competitive bid
requirement is mentioned. Thus it would probably be concluded
that if the legislature intended the competitive bid statute to
apply, it would have done something more than reject H.B. 175
and authorize power in KPDO to approve development organizations.2 8
However, in light of the unique nature of the Districts, they
might be construed to fall within another competitive bid statute
applicable to any "city, county or district, or board or commis2
26

KRS § 45.360.

Gregory v. Lewisport, 869 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1963), construed the competitive bid statute as "aimed primarily at the construction of buildings for public
use and where a building is being acquired for use of private industry the courts
should not search for possible motives of evasion in the plan for acquisition of the
building if the plan does not literally violate the statutes." Here the plan for a
private
had a legitimate purpose: to insure that the building would conform
to the27requirements of the lessee for whose use the building was designed.
Commonwealth v. Nunn, 452 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1970).
28Even if the statute were applicable, most of the District's spending could
probably escape under exemption (f) "for professional, technical, or artistic
services.
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sion or a city or county."29 An attorney general opinion interprets
this statute where the question arose whether the Ohio County
Buildings Commission was required to advertise for bids upon
the materials and equipment to be installed in the Ohio County
Nursing and Convalescent Home.30 Under the Hill-Burton Act,
a federal grant-in-aid program designed to assist local governmental units in acquiring adequate hospital and nursing facilities
for the citizens of the community, the federal government provided a percentage of the cost of the facilities. The public
money, here that of Ohio County, was obtained through the
issuance of revenue bonds designed to be retired out of rentals
accruing from the operation of the convalescent home.
The thrust of this opinion is toward applying KRS 424.260
to the Development District, since the Development District
will be commingling and spending local, state and federal funds.
However, by its own terms KRS 424.260 only includes "contractual services other than professional," which exception might
exclude much of the ADDs' routine spending. Further, if the
theory of the recent Nunn3' case is literally carried to its logical
conclusion, the spending of an ADD would require express legislative designation to include it under competitive bid statutes.
E. ARE DISTRICT MEMBERS SUBJECT TO CONFLICT OF
INTEREST STATUTES?
The modem blending of public and private resources to
execute tasks which traditionally seemed more appropriate for
government employees raises great potential for conflict of
interest. These problems on the federal level, have been handled
by standards of conduct for regular government employees.31
Agencies may also impose additional requirements such as
financial disclosure requirements. 33 In the case of special government employees such as consultants, advisors, and others on occasional attachment to the government, relaxed standards are
34
imposed in order to assure their availability to the government.
29
30
31

KRS § 424.260.
Op. ATry. GEN. 65-746.

Note 27, supra.

32E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 11 (1948).
33 I-olfield, Conflicts of Interest in Government Contractor Relationships, 24
FED. Bj. 299 (1964).
34See P.L. 87-849 (1962).
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Special problems arise in attempting to regulate both profit and
non-profit corporations under consulting contracts in order to
maintain substantial performance and objectivity, and to guard
against the temptation to use the contract for subsequent personal or organizational gain. 5 In any given case, where federal
development money is being expended through state channels,
it may be that a federal statute or regulation on conflicts of
interest could be applicable. Assuming however, the nonapplicability of federal statutes, what statutes could be looked
to on the state level?
36
In the absence of a specific statute governing the ADDs,
it is doubtful from the decided cases, that the Kentucky courts
would use liberal interpretation or devise common law rules to
cover the Districts. 7 However, a typical district charter may
provide that "no person, persons, or firms shall obtain any personal or pecuniary profit from the transactions of the corporation,
other than to enjoy the public improvements and developments
created by the corporation solely for the public." 8 This type of
provision, or KPDO regulations, might be given the same effect
as a conflict of interest statute. In Norvell v. Judd, 9 the defendant
was an employee and officer of the Housing Commission, and
was also paid a fixed fee for the performance of his duties as
director of a non-profit corporation furnishing television cable
service to housing development tenants. The Court held his
duties as director of the non-profit corporation, which consisted
of providing new subscribers for the television corporation would
bring his "interest" within the prohibitions of KRS 80.080.
35

Note 33, supra.
Although fairly elaborate provisions were available, (see Part XI, §§ 11011103 of an Introduction to an Area Planning and Development Act,) we do not
find conflict of interest provisions in original H.B. 175 or 176, or in the fial
legislation. See also conflict of interest provisions contained in the Kentucky Urban
36

and Community Development Act, 1(11S § 99.350(7).
Renewal
7
3 E.g., In Sims v. Bradley, 18 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1949), the major and exofficio member of the zoning commission was not disqualified from sitting as a
member of the Commission, where his wife was the owner of part of the property
being considered during zoning of the block, and he had a financial interest. The
Court pointed out that Section 57 of the Kentucky Constitution referred only to
members of the General Assembly and was not controlling. Since the statutes
KRS § 100.390 and § 100.400) did not require a unanimous vote if a quorum was

present and since the Resolution of the Zoning Commission was passed by a vote
of three members, exclusive of the Major with a quorum present, it was proper that
he sat on the Commission.
38 Kentucky River Area Development District Charter.
39 374 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1963).
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Norvell also routinely held that a state taxpayer clearly has
standing to challenge the validity of the agreement, and thus it
is conceivable that contracts let by an ADD could be subject
to judicial review for violations of the conflict of interest provisions in their charters.
IV. CONCLUSION
Who knows what the future holds for the Kentucky Program
Development Office and the Area Development Districts? Since
their essential activity is controlling the expenditure of federal
money at the local level, they will be tied to politics. Thus any
predicitions are foolhardy at best. But perhaps a few conditioning trends can be stated. First, the underlying problem will
remain since we will probably continue a system of collecting a
large amount of revenue through the federal income tax and
expending it on local problems.4 ° Second, the basic need for
rational expenditure of public money will increase and will
transcend political changes in administrations at both the federal
and state levels; thus the comprehensive systems being devised
by professional planners will survive, although the emphasis,
the details, and the personnel will change.4 Third, public interest
advocacy will bring to the courts more demands for judicial
review of the planning and spending functions of both federal
4 2
and state governments.
If the description of these trends is accurate, how should the
judiciary, the legislature and the bar respond? At least two sets
of public interests should be kept in mind. First, the public has
a strong interest in the execution of comprehensive planning and
efficient spending without delaying, harrassing litigation. But
the public has a stronger interest in "open standards, open findings, open reasons, and open precedent."43 In the rush to legislate
40 The merging plan for federal revenue sharing does not appear to affect a
significant percentage of the flow-back.
41 A parallel historical experience would be the absorption of Keynesian
economic theory and New Deal programs into both political parties.
42 See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970) (Sierra Club did
not have standing to challenge Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture decisions
granting rights in Mineral King Valley to a Walt Disney development company),
cert. 4granted
- U.S. - (1970).
3
Davis, DiscretionaryJustice, 23 J. oF LEGAL EDuc. 56, 60 (1971); See also
Hanes, Citizen ParticipationAnd Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsive Administrative Action, 24 S.W.L.J. 731 (1970).
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the KPDO into being, the Kentucky General Assembly properly
served the first set of interests but it did not adequately protect
the second. In the next legislative session, the General Assembly
should consider amending Chapter 147A to: (1) specifically
legislate on the composition of the District Boards, including the
possibility of requiring election of the lay representatives to the
Boards; (2) require open public access to the records of the
District and meetings of the Board; (3) require the Districts
to use competitive bid or negotiation practices; and (4) apply
conflict of interest statutes to the Board members and District
personnel. In the absence of amending legislation, the bar and
the judiciary ought to become sympathetic to fashioning equitable remedies to control the possibility of poor decisions in the
expenditure of public money. The planning and spending process
can probably never be non-political, but it can at least be made
to work through a medium channeling it toward an approximation of the public interest.

